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ABSTRACT 
The Old Bondeni area, the former 'native location' of Nakurujwas 
scheduled for demolition and redevelopment some twenty years ago. Aside from 
demolition at the periphery carried out in the 1950s, the bulk of housing 
still stands. This has not been for want of administrative initiative. 
Bondeni represents a rare case study which permits one to consider shifts in 
official position and changing attitudes towards redevelopment as applied to 
a single community. . This paper discusses the various plans and suggestions 
put forward over the years, the climate of opinion within officialdom which 
these reflected, and the reactions and expectations these initiatives aroused 
in the community residents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A generation of Kenyans has grown up since the Old Bondeni area 
was first scheduled for demolition and redevelopment,, The series of plans and 
initiatives fills many municipal files. Bondeni represents a rare case 
which permits us to consider shifts in official position and changing attitudes 
1 
towards redevelopment as applied to a single community,, 
In the first part of the paper we will trace the antecedents of 
the policy which resulted in a decision by the Municipal Council in 1953 that 
Old Bondeni be demolished,, The subsequent sections will deal with the 
implications of the failure (and fragmentary implementation) of that programme 
and the redevelopment schemes proposed since, for what they can tell about 
changing approaches to policy-formation and urban development„ The accent 
will be on the changing view of the African townsman,, the nature of his urban 
commitment and what obligations the town bears him. 
The concluding section reconsiders this case with a view to raising 
briefly the social problems of a community facing redevelopment,, Finally, 
the difficult position facing the municipal administration is recapitulated 
and a case made for returning this sort of problem to the community level. 
IDEOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONGRUENCE 
The first sections of this paper deal with the period before the 
end of the Second World War. This was a period when the congruence of 
interests and viewpoints between the agricultural settler community and the 
urban service community was quite exact; a period when clearly the town was 
2 
run for its hinterland. The African worker in Nakuru, like his rural counter-
part, the squatter, lived there not by right but by sufferance of the auth-3 
orities. The town preferred to ignore him. This was a convenient ideology 
which kept the African invisible and thereby made it possible for urban auth-
orities to minimise any obligations towards him, and so concentrate resources 
on developing services for the expatriate population. 
1. For a parallel discussion of urban development policies from a more 
general perspective, see Stren, 2C. 
2. For the extent of the town's subordination to the "country®, see 
Elspeth Huxley, 10. She quotes Lord Delamere, the most influential settler in 
the Nakuru area, as telling an audience made up mostly of Nakuru businessmen 
that he did not favour spending money on the town's development because he did not 
want to see the creation of "cow towns" in such a small country, (p. 255) 
3. The comparison may seem inexact because labour was seen as transient 
contract labour, while the rural squatter was stabilised labour. I will maintain 
the comparison, however, because the case area, Old Bondeni, was started as a 
location for long-term dwellers. For a discussion of the rural side of the 
comparison, see Furedi, 3. 
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The maintenance of this fiction of invisibility required mostly 
negative policies, policies aimed at control1 andi which safeguarded' 
the interests of the dominant community,, Control was attempted through public 
health by-laws, demarcating segregated residential areas, restricting access 
to the town, etc„ These policies touched on housing in several ways and 
represented the context within which Old Bondeni, the African Location, grew 
up; however, it was not a housing policy,, Housing policy (and more broadly, 
community development policy) was incompatible with such a viewpoint; so long 
as there was no positively-conceived place for an African community in town, 
for African townsmen, there was no sense in a housing policy. 
With a growing African population in Nakuru and a more complex 
relationship coming into being between the town and its rural surroundings, 
the fiction became at once more difficult to maintain and less convenient. 
It was at this point, in the mid to late 1930s,that the inivisibility of the 
Africans became most clearly defined in legal terms ^ and began to break 
down in practice. The changes in policies that these strains demanded had 
to await the post-war period and will be discussed in later sections. 
Before introducing the case material it is necessary to emphasise 
that this presentation is a simplification. The position of the African in 
Nakuru was a by-product of general policy concerning African labour in 
5 
colonial Kenya of that period. That was that Africans should not be 
detribalised, not stabilised as a work force permanently outside tribal areas 
and tribal controls. This philosophy meant that labour need be a minimal 
drain on the urban purse (as African community supports were in the reserves) 
in fact that expenditure should be minimal because the provision of urban 
services beyond a certain level would encourage detribalisation, false 
expectations, etc. After all, Kenya's colonial economy depended on its 
maintaining a competitive position in world commodity markets. That 
demanded a cheap labour economy with wages maintained at or even just below 
the subsistence.level of the work force which in the latter case was subvented 
by non-cash inputs from the reserves. 
4. See the discussion on the Control of Persons (Africans) Bylaws 
which follows. 
5. This discussion involves a further simplification in that many 
Kenyan colonial policies represented inputs from other areas, especially 
South Africa, India and Great Britain itself, (i leave aside the 
policy of indirect rule enunciated by Lugard and others.) See, for example, 
Orde-Browne, 16. 
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Nakuru^ Early Central Place Functions 
Nakuru came into existence as a railway station in 1900,, It was 
to become an important rail centre because it marked that point in the 
Uganda line where it started to grade upward over the western wall of the 
Great Rift Valley. In 1904 it was gazetted a township with an area defined 
by a circle of one mile radius with the railroad station at its centre. At 
that date it consisted of a loco-shed, station, some railway housing and 
c 
two Indian dukas, the beginning of a bazaar. 
Its place of importance as a railway town was enhanced when it 
became headquarters for the Northern Railway District in 1906. Its stock 
rose still further when the government moved the Provincial Headquarters from 
Naivasha to Nakuru in 1908 because of Nakuru's more central position. Nakuru 
had a particularly healthy climate and was located between two arresting sights — 
Lake Nakuru and Menengai Creater. So to its other features, Nakuru added 
a modest attraction as a resort; the first hotel going up in 1906. (see 10) 
These functions played by Nakuru, that of communications/transportation 
node, administrative centre, and recreational, commercial, and then agro-
industrial focus for an important segment of the settler community, presaged 
its growth and shaped its development. The accommodation to growth, the 
directions in which development was fostered, the contradictions that built 
up in terms of defining a place for Africans in the town, must all be seen 
in respect to this complex of functions. 
Just Passing Through; Early Definitions of the African's Place in Nakuru 
The pattern of residential segregation was formalised early in 
Nakuru's development. In 1913 the township area was tripled to ten square 
miles. This was divided (for administrative purposes and not officially) 
in 1914 into six areas: government officers® quarters, the Indian bazaar, 
European business quarter, European residential area, Indian 'coolies' lines 
and the native lines. 
Africans of course resided in small numbers in all sections of 
town. Outside of their labour lines some lived as house servants and employees 
on their employers' property. Africans as a group were still administratively 
invisible. 
In 1914 the African population of Nakuru numbered 500, while by 
1918 it stood at perhaps 800. The population growth was all the more noticeable 
in that during the war the expatriate population had declined . (22, pp. 13-14) 
6. Much of this historical material is taken from Tamarkin, 22. 
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A further influx of population occured in the period following 
World War I, stimulated by the peacetime business recovery. It was at this 
point that Old Bondeni began. It was the first African residential area (as 
opposed to institutional labour lines). It grew up within a rough rectangle 
of land directly south of the railway landhies and administration lines, with 
an initial focus at the northeast corner where a mosque and secondarily a 
Co M.S. mission were established. 
The right to build in Old Bondeni was granted to individuals who 
had done service for the crown in the war effort and to other Africans of 
good character who came to establish themselves in the town. This early group 
of householders is to be considered the first group of Africans who were 
acknowledged as town dwellers as opposed to migrant labour in Nakuru, They 
too were people out of their place though, truly displaced people. They were 
Swahilis or Swahilicised people from the coast, from Tanzania, from Ukamba, 
i.e. far from their homelands, who had business in town. Some (like the smaller 
community of Somalis who were at this time establishing a comparable neighbour-
hood just northeast of Old Bondeni) had been engaged in the long-distance cattle 
7 
trade. Others it seems were headmen in railway crews and so might expect 
better housing than a ten by ten foot room in the labour lines. 
The right to build In Old Bondeni was granted subject to two provisos 
which expressed the administration's attitude towards Africans in town. An 
Individual who was granted a temporary occupation license through the D.C. 
could construct a dwelling with the approval of the public health authorities. 
Upon payment of annual (peppercorn) rates, the householder1 could live on 
the plot indefinitely. However, licenses could be withdrawn at any time upon g 
three months' notice without compensation being payable for the housing. 
The land always remained the possession of the crown. The first proviso then 
was that as a group Africans must not come to represent a public health nuisance, 
and maintenance of minimum standards would be expected even within the segregated 
area. The second and more fundamental provision was that Africans, even the 
most established ones, were not of the town but resided there on sufferance. 
Insecurity was institutionalised. Licensees did not own the land their house 
stood on and their right to the house itself was terminable at any point. 
Moreover, in law (but not in practice) the licenses were not transferable; 
they couldn't be sold, given away or passed on to heirs. 
7. From interviews with Old Bondeni elders, February and March 1974. 
8. These conditions meant that construction was in non-permanent 
materials and not in stone. 
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In the first few years of its development, licensees in Old Bondeni 
put up family dwellings. These were rectangular four-' or six-roomed houses, 
the broad side of which contained the central doorway fronting the plot. The 
houses were of mud and pole or mud-brick construction, plastered over, with 
a peaked roof. The door opened on a central passageway which ran through the 
dwelling giving out on a rear courtyard with its outbuildings, stores, etc. 
These were traditional urban family dwellings (so called majengo housing ) 
of a kind found widely throughout East Africa. 
The inherent flexibility and expansibility of this house form meant 
that even slight land pressure made it worthwhile to extend the house and 
take in lodgers. In 1921 it was decided that the Uasin Gishu branch line 
would start at Nakuru and a further influx of railroad labourers into Nakuru 
took place. The railway had built 150 rooms in their camp (called Ziwani) 
by 1920, but now there was a spillover into adjacent Old Bondeni. To take 
advantage of this situation, householders added rows of single rooms along 
one or both sides of the courtyard at the back of their houses. This resulted 
in a structure shaped like a hollow rectangle around a central courtyard/passage-
way with the housefront now being the narrower side. 
Within this arrangement there is considerable flexibility for the 
owner. The larger rooms of the original family dwelling (still identifiable 
by the higher roof'line) might be turned into shops or businesses facing the 
road. Small back rooms with external doors might be used as charcoal stores. 
Rooms might be let singly or in combination. 
Attractive features for the tenant were the relative privacy of 
his own door combined with quite good security in that rooms opened onto an 
interior passage and strangers would inevitably be noticed. 
In the 1920s, although the African population of Nakuru (and 
especially that of Old Bondeni) was growing, policy with regard to the African's 
place in town was not further defined. During the first half of the next 
decade the African papulation first declined to perhaps 3,000 from a level 
11 
of about 3,500 and then stabilised at about 3,150„ That was still a very 
sizeable population and when the area began to recover from the worst of the 
depression there could be no justification for continuing to ignore it. 
Effective control of that population could not be achieved merely by enacting 
9. From interviews with Mzee Titi, Old Bondeni, March 1974. 
10. East African Railway, District Surveyor's Office, registers. 
11. Municipal Council of Nakuru, Annual Reports, 1932 and 1936. All figures 
were estimates based on an administrative survey of Africans in town taken in 1931. 
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21 strict bylaws; the Municipal Board had to establish closer contact. 
Fundamental changes in the economic structure of Nakuru started 
in the mid-1930s which created further contradictions in the defined position 
of Africans in town„ Some accommodation to the necessities of the altered 
economic situation was attempted; some community services were started or 
encouraged by the Board0 But policy didn't alter quickly because of 
ideological inertia (Nakuru's leadership remained much the same into the 
post-war period), and because of the administrative disruption caused by 
World War II„ The recovery in Nakuru's hinterland in the late 1930s included 
attempts at substantially diversifying the agricultural economy- This made 
possible a more broadly based industry in the town and important agro-
industries joined the few already there. 
Housing pressure grew as well, and along with it demand for further 
services. Fair numbers of people were being housed by their employers; one 
example was the Nakuru Blanket compound (on their factory grounds on the 
eastern outskirts of town far from the Native Locations). The Municipality 
was able to build a few rooms for its staffs in 1942 and 1944 they put up 
33 rooms for works employees and brewery staff, mostly in the Municipal Depot 
13 
area just north of the Railway's African Quarters. Nonetheless Old Bondeni 
had been absorbing a large number of people and overcrowding was already 
regarded as serious by the Board. In 1943 it was estimated that Old Bondeni 
housed 2,000 people. In 1944 a separate Native Housing Committee was set up. 
It proposed demolition of the location and called for the appointment of a 
European location superintendent. (22, p. 34) Further elaboration of this 
policy of demolishing and redeveloping Old Bondeni, and integration of this 
plan into a wider housing and development policy, awaited the end of the war. 
STABILISATION OF THE WORK FORCE, A NEW URBAN FOCUS AND JUNIOR-PARTNER 
MULTI-RACIALISM 
A number of forces came together in the post-war period to redefine 
the position of the African population in town and formulate the specifics 
of a housing programme which took that position into account. Some of these 
forces had been undermining the old position for a decade and more, others 
had just arisen. Together they formed a new synthesis; one not entirely 
divorced from the old definitions but clearly representing a new direction. 
The diversification of the economic base of the town and especially 
the establishment of industries which were fairly sophisticated technically 
12. For a discussion of the implications of these control measures on 
housing and urban development, see Van Zwanenberg, 23. 
13i Municipal Board of Nakuru, Annual Reports, 1942, 1944. Hereafter 
these will be referred to in the text simply as Annual Reports. 
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made greater demands on the labour force. In all but the most unskilled work, 
experience was an advantage and there were costs of high labour turnover. 
As industries became important in the town, the notion of a stabilised African 
urban work force gained currency. 
The growth of this industrial sector, and especially the large agro-
industries, had another and even more profound effect. It altered the nature 
of the symbiotic relationship between hinterland and town."^ Increasingly 
Nakuru was becoming more important as a market for the famers' produce than 
they were as a market for the town. Nakuru became development-conscious and 
more urban-focussed. Further development meant further industry. In order 
to attract new industry the town had to supply basic infrastructure, adequate 
water supply, rail or road-serviced industrial plots, and other amenities 
including provision for housing the work-force. 
Taking a new position was easier too because of changes in both 
the European and African populations in Nakuru. The development ideology 
(and with it a 'Nakuru-first® feeling) gained ground as a new wave of European 
migrants, many of them ex-servicemen, settled in town to take up technical 
15 and professional jobs. Within a matter of years this group had a powerful 
16 
voice in the municipal government. Changes in the African population were 
also important. The experiences and the perspectives gained by Africans who 
served in the global conflict introduced a new sophistication and a stridency 
into the community. That element was important nationally in the further 
development of politically-oriented groups and labour unions and in Nakuru 
in the emergence of a strong and articulate voice which argued for greater 
participation by the African community in its own affairs and in the interests 
of the town, (For a lengthy discussion, see 22.) 
The socio-political slant which the European community found congenial 
was less paternalistic and more realistic; it recognised the legitimate existence 
of an African community in the town and the desirability of making it a 
responsible, able and committed one. In this view, African demands could 
be satisfied and African efforts could be directed into a long-term evolution 
towards parity. This was then an ameliorative and gradualist policy whereby 
the African as junior partner and the European as mentor and senior partner 
were to work for development in their mutual best interests. 
14. For a general discussion of a contentious nature on the balance 
that should be struck between city and hinterland, see Gerhart, 5. 
15. From interviews with Mr. W. Sayer, Nakuru, 1974. 
16. See Tamarkin, 22, p. 25f for a discussion of the rise of the Nakuru 
Township Association formed in 1948 to promote Nakuru as a centre for secondary 
industry. It elected a number of members to the Board in 1949, and in 1951, when 
a prominent member became chairman of the Board, its job was done and it dissolved. 
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A housing policy in the broad as well as the narrow sense was 
called for by all these factors. It would help attract industry, stabilise 
the work-force, and by ameliorating the African's life in town encourage 
17 
commitment and increase satisfaction with the current order of things. 
The Decision to Demolish - Early Plans 
The new urban development initiative that built up slowly following 
World War II reacted to the need for housing for Nakuru's African population. 
Inadequate housing created a threefold problem : first of all, a health 
problem caused by overcrowding,"^ poor sanitation,"^ and so on; a social 
problem represented by high rents for inadequate accommodation, a floating 
population with no permanent abode at all, etc.; and an economic problem in 
that business could hardly be attracted or encouraged to expand if there was 
no place for its labour force to find reasonable lodging in the town. 
In 1946 the Town Planning Advisor was considering revisions in 
the lay-out of the locations and certain plans were firming up : sites for 
new government and railroad housing for example. However it was to be a slow 
start. The Nakuru Board reported that though "housing accommodation in 
Nakuru J_ was J acute for all races, until building materials j_ were_7 in free 
supply little improvement would be effected. Consideration /_ would_7 have 
to be given to alternate building materials and probable relaxation of the 
Bylaws." (Annual Report, 1946) 
A provisional Development Plan was exhibited for public comment 
in 1947. Because there was such a pressing need for housing, a 'temporary' 
substandard scheme (Pangani) was underway and nine ten-room landhies were 
completed and occupied that year. There was a long waiting list. The scheme 
was completed in the following year and added 324 rooms to the housing stock. 
(Annual Report, 1947) 
In 1948, the Development Plan was approved by the Board. It set 
out the policy to be adopted with respect to Old Bondeni:-
17. For a good discussion of this shift in policy, see Stren, 19. 
18. Municipal authorities, investigating conditions in Old Bondeni 
in the early 1950s, were surprised at the extent of overcrowding. One notable 
case was that of a room 8' x 12* which was occupied by eight adults, some 
using it by night and others, who worked night shifts, sleeping there during 
the day. (From interviews with Mr, W. Sayer, Nakuru, 1974) 
19. Sanitation problems included, aside from inadequate pit latrines 
and the like, a large number of goats and sheep which created a continual 
nuisance. Minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Committee meeting of 
18 June 1952. 
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A large proportion of the houses in this location 
have reached a stage when they are barely fit for 
human habitation,, Schemes have been put forward by 
the African Location Planning Sub-Committee and 
duly approved whereby a fresh area is to be laid 
out with plots available to Africans and employers 
of labour, for building in permanent materials on a 
99-year lease, In accordance with plans approved 
by the Municipal Board, Facilities will be 'offered 
to lessees of existing plots in the old Location to 
move to the new area and, at a future date when the 
ground occupied by the present Location has recovered, 
rebuilding will commence. In the meantime, no 
further building is to be permitted in the old 
Location, The project has been discussed by the 
Nakuru African Advisory Council, where the general 
reaction was extremely favourable. It is, however, felt 
by the Advisory Council that the present suggestion 
that existing temporary occupation licenses for plots 
in the old Location should terminate after five years, 
is too short a period and an extension is under 
consideration, 
A second aspect of municipal policy was also made official that 
year; the budget debate produced a resolution that "a housing fund be started 
to provide, progressively, housing for labour; first in temporary material 
and afterwards the accumulation of a fund for building in permanent materials 
for this purpose," (Annual Report 1948) 
Because there was little chance of building up a housing fund 
quickly and borrowing on the scale necessary was difficult to arrange, the 
municipal authorities looked for ways of sharing the burden. One expedient 
for spreading the burden that the Municipal Board considered was "that new 
plots should be offered as soon as possible to house owners in the old 
location, whose notices to demolish can only become effective five years 
20 
after alternative plots have been provided". Municipal authorities soon 
reconsidered this plan as they convinced themselves that it would likely 
result in substandard housing being re-erected. An experiment with a tenant 
purchase scheme proved inconclusive. No workable solution to municipal housing 
had been found. 
20, Annual Report, 1949, As it turns out this was one of the most be,nign 
of the misconceptions that plagued the negotiations between Bondeni residents 
and the municipal authorities. According to the original post-World-War-II 
leases, the sites could be reclaimed on as little as three months' notice. 
For a long time municipal officials did not have examples of the original 
leases (nor even apparently of later forms issued in the late 1920s by the 
D.C.'s office). When the authorities later re-evaluated their position 
vis-a-vis houseowners and felt able to take a much stronger stance, this 
only added to the sense of misunderstanding and antagonism. 
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The Start - Quit Notices 
21 As 1953 approached the municipal authorities found themselves 
confronted with their own deadline for starting to demolish Old Bondeni. 
There were several incentives to get on with this. The first, certainly 
the first one mentioned, was to remove the menace to public health Old 
Bondeni represented. Aside from that there were less tangible concerns: 
the desire to meet development goals, to progressively improve the town in 
an orderly fashion, and closely related to that, the desire of the newly 
constituted urban authority to remove what was in their eyes a symbol of 
the old, now unacceptable ways. And there was an overtly political interest 
as well: with the declaration of the Emergency, the disorder and the largely 
unpoliced activities in Old Bondeni were perhaps threatening and certainly 
undesirable,, (Annual Report, 1952) 
But demolition depended on the provision of alternative housing. 
And as there seemed to be no other expeditious way (as we saw above) for 
this to be provided, the Council was forced to undertake the building itself. 
Even though the Council committed itself to give priority to African housing 
(Housing Committee meeting, 9 June 1952) and planned to borrow what was at 
22 
the time a very large sum to fulfill that commitment, because there were 
other calls on the housing, Bondeni's demolition could not be planned in a 
single or even a few stages. But some beginning needed to be made. On 
August 31, 1953 the Council formally served "notices of termination of 
license" on all plotholders in Old Bondeni and the Somali location. This 
required them to quit their plots and surrender them in one year's time. 
The first stages of the municipal housing estate programme, which 
the demolition was to be tied to, were Kivumbini I and II. These were both 
scheduled for opening in 1953 and added 624 dwelling rooms. (N.C.N. Housing 
and Estates Department files, memorandum on council estates, 1974) Because 
of the pressing need for worker accommodation, the housing was spoken of in 
terms of bedspaces, in this case three to a room. But the estates attracted 
the interest of other local authorities because the housing was designed to 
bridge the gap between this urgent short-term need for bedspaces to house 
23 
single workers and long-term needs for family accommodation. The structures 
consisted of back-to-back units of four single rooms. They could be converted 
21. By 1953 Nakuru was governed by a Municipal Council, an improvement over 
the board structure; this was in keeping with Nakuru's development aspirations. 
22. The capital estimates for 1953 budgeted £270,000 for the five-year 
housing plan. Of this, €120,000, or the largest single sum, was for African 
housing. (Housing Committee meeting, 13 August 1952) 
23. Nakuru's reputation was high as it had been singled out by the labour 
advisor to the Secretary of State as having the best native housing of any small 
town in British Africa. See the description in 9. 
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into two-roomed family units with W.C0 and kitchen added on. The demands 
of continued growth which lasted into the late 1950s^growth expectations and 
the housing lag lasting into the early 1960s (until the pre-independence 
panic), and of course the need to relocate Old Bondeni residents in order 
24 
to get on with demolition, meant that this design option was seldom used. 
Phases of Demolition and Debate 
Within a few weeks of the quit notices being served, a latter was 
received by the Council from six plotholders representing the householders 
in Old Bondeni. They asked for a meeting with the Council to further consider 
the matter. The Council responded by putting off the meeting while a "detailed 
memorandum ... outlining the Council's proposals for future development of the 
whole area" was being prepared (Housing and Estates Committee meeting, 
21 September 1953), and at a subsequent meeting chose a committee to attend 
the meeting (M.N.C. meeting, 5 October 1953) with representatives from the 
locations (one of whom must be a Somali). (Town Planning Committee meeting, 
7 October 1953) 
2: 
The meeting took place before the memorandum was officially completed,, 
I will set out the main points covered In the meeting In some detail because 
much the same ground was to be covered In every subsequent meeting. The 
meeting, being only an initial statement and first tentative questioning of 
redevelopment policy, was relatively calm and coherent. Other meetings will 
be contrasted with this one mainly in terms of the polarisation of views and 
the style of interaction. 
The meeting was opened by the Mayor who expressed the "earnest wish 
of the Council to assist „ „ „ in every way possible". He then outlined the 
Council's policys 
1) In no circumstances could the Coucil agree to any extension. 
2) No compensation would be considered. 
3) Displaced persons would either be offered alternative accommodation 
in municipal housing or on plots of land which they could develop 
themselves at appropriate standards. 
4) In genuine cases of hardship the Council would consider offering 
financial assistance under the terms of the Vasey scheme. (11) 
5) Plotholders with sufficient funds should consider themselves 
suitable applicants for the Council's tenant purchase type houses. 
24. Interviews with W. Sayer, Nakuru, 1974. 
25. This meeting was held on 24 November 1953. The Mayor was in the chair, 
the D.C0, the Deputy Mayor and four Councillors represented the administration, 
while four Bondeni householders and one Somali elder represented the licensees. 
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6) The Council would give special consideration to those cases 
where hardship was likely to be suffered where elderly men and 
women were concerned, to ensure that they would be re-
accommodated within the means at their disposal. However, 
the responsibility for elderly people fell primarily on their 
families and each case would be very carefully considered on 
its merits. 
7) To enable the Council to appreciate the circumstances of all 
residents in Bondeni and Somali locations, it had been decided 
to carry out a detailed survey. 
a) It should be clear to everyone that no householders in either 
location possessed any legal title to their plots. 
9) To enable people to develop their own plots in permanent materials 
it was possible that additional land might be included in the 
location. 
IO) The demolition would be carried out in phases, depending upon 
the land requirements of the Council, 
These points answered some of the questions that the householders 
had listed on their agenda. These included requests for an extension of the 
quit deadline from one year to.ten years in the case of Bondeni and to five 
years for the Somali location, compensation for the houses, that landlords 
be given advance warning of demolition, etc. They also made additional 
requests which were referred to appropriate Council committees for consider-
ation. These included the request that leases on new plots be for longer 
terms than the suggested 40 years; that existing shopkeepers be given priority 
in the allotment of tenancies in the new trading centre; that the Council permit 
the establishment of shops in the residential areas as well; that individuals 
be allowed to build their houses in stages as their financial situation permitted; 
and that, in view of the fact that many plotholders earned their living by 
the establishment of lodging houses, the Council consider the erection of 
suitable houses for renting or tenant-purchase. 
The beginning of demolition came as a great shock to people - crowds 
26 
watched the bulldozers do their work. Even after the planning and the 
27 notices, the meetings and the clarifications, demolition had little sense 
26. Interview with Mr. S.L. Ojuka, 18 March 1974, 
27. From 1953 on, rent receipts from householders were endorsed with the 
legend "property subject to demolition, no compensation payable", (Letter 
from Senior D„C. to Secretary for Local Government, Nairobi, 29 June 1956) 
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of actuality until it happened, (Perhaps that was partly because of the 
necessarily long discussions; it seemed it could be discussed forever,) 
The first phases of demolition however did not create any very organised 
opposition. Small areas of Old Bondeni were cleared ( to make 
room for expansion of social services of various sorts] and tenants were moved 
into municipal housing - Kivumbini II and later Shauri Yako when it was opened 
28 
in 1955, A pilot tenant-purchase scheme of twelve houses had been built 
in 1954 which might have catered for (but was not expressly built for) some 
plotholders who had capital, but the terms were not very attractive and 29 
plotholders did not take it up. Concessions to bona-fide plotholders, i.e. 
original licensees or their dependents, might properly take the form of leasehold 
plots they would develop themselves (as was argued by the resident magistrate 
in his judgement of 22 May 1956). But, all in all, the plotholders had not 
pressed their case to the fullest yet. 
Opposition to the program of demolition increased when the Council 
finally came to consider demolition of the Somali Location. There were several 
reasons why the Somalis, who in many respects did not differ greatly from 
the bulk of Bondeni plotholders (who were equally long-term, fully-committed 
urban-dwellers, also Muslim, also earning much of their income from house 
rents, etc.), were able to force their special interests on the attention 
of the civic authorities. The first is that, as they formed a relatively 
small group and were to face demolition all at one time, it was easier for 
them to put up a common fight. Bondeni plotholders who might have years 
more enjoyment of their housing would not be so likely to form a strong 
common front when only small sections of Bondeni were being demolished in 
the early phases. 
A second major reason is more complex and more interesting in 
terms of the nature of the debate that ensued? namely, the administrative 
status of the Somalis. The Somalis were not regarded as Africans by the 
colonial government, and in part at least, because the Somalis grew up with 
these legal definitions of the British, they also saw themselves as apart from 
the African community. The very fact of a specific Somali location confirmed 
28. These estate names do tell a story of political conflict of a sort 
which took place in that era. Kivumbini (in the dust) was not a popular name 
with the Council; it symbolised the poor conditions that Africans saw them-
selves as suffering compared to other groups in the city. Lake Nakuru was 
nearly dry at that time and acrid soda dust blew into the estates (and 
only to a lesser extent further up into the town); hence this name. Shauri 
Yake (your problem) was supposedly adopted as a name in that this housing 
was to be accepted by people who were redeveloped out of a room; finding any 
alternative was their problem. 
29. Letter from Senior D,C. to Secretary for Local Government, Nairobi, 
29 June 1956. 
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their separateness and reinforced their sense of community,, They owed their 
separate status (as they did their plots) to a historical relationship with 
the Crowns a "child of colonialism1", one of several sorts that the Kenya colony 
produced,, This gave them some additional leverage,, Africans, very tightly 
controlled during the Emergency, could not so easily organise themselves in 
opposition to the authorities,, Demolition was relatively easy for the munici-
pality under these circumstances when Africans had to be careful how they 
responded?Somalis could take a slightly different tack. 
The Council knew that the Somalis had political resources to fight 
for their interests',, They were anxious not to be embarrassed or to have the 
colonial administration embarrased. The Somalis had shown their willingness 
to fight during the Bondeni demolitions of 1956 when they prevailed upon 
the Kenya Muslim League to petition against this demolition to government 
30 
and took the matter outside the local arena. The Council therefore took 
a long time over preliminaries, trying to tie the Somalis to various agreements. 
In a meeting between Council representatives, the Divisional Engineer, the 
railroad corporation and Somali representatives held on August 9, 1957, the 
plot for the new Somali location was visited and a general baraza (meeting) 
was planned to get Somali approval,, The Town Clerk approached the Somalis' 
lawyers, the firm of Shaply, Barret and Allen, advocates in Nairobi, to try 
to arrange for an irrevocable agreement to be signed so as to avoid; "any 
possible misunderstanding when the time comes for development, as, from past 
experience, while the Somali Elders have always proved themselves most cooperative 31 misunderstandings have often occurred",, 
The Council updated the public health evidence for demolition in 
a report by the Medical Officer of HealthS-
On the 16th of June 1958, the Deputy Town Clerk ... 
and I made a tour of inspection of the Bondeni and 
Somali Locations..„„ 
... Cesspits, pits and rubbish dumps are spread over 
the area...„ The number of choos is far below that 
necessary for the population. 
The/structure of these old dilapidated houses 
is such as to harbour vermin and insects of almost 
all varieties found in human dwellings, and it is 
obvious that were plague to break out... the entire 
population would have to be moved at once„.a.ajl Only 
demolition with the aid of fire ..„ could „„„ make 
the area reasonably safe for building later. 
30. Letter revealing this situation from the D6Ce s Nakuru to the P.C., 
Rift Valley Province, 14 July 19580 
31. Letter from the Town1 Clerk' to the Commissioner of Lands, Nairobi, 
15 August 1957. 
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Overcrowding is at once apparent „. „ . Entire 
families of 4 or 5 persons are living in single 
rooms, and the party walls are in many cases 
incomplete so that privacy between neighbours 
is quite impossible,, 
The water supply is from outdoor standpipes, 
which drift and make the surrounding ground soggy 
and a place eminently suited for the spread of 
hookworm. 
Ventilation is by chance and not by management; 
cracks in walls,... Many of these cracks are of such 
size as to provide a threat of physical injury to 
children by the falling of building materials on 
them. 
Floors are in almost all cases of mud, and a 
large population of them are at such a level as 
are apt to become water-logged and boggy in wet 
weather,, 
The Council also reviewed the administrative and political pros 
32 
and cons of the two paths open to them to force demolitions the Recovery 
of Possession of Property Ordinance whereby the whole plot is demolished 
(used in the Old Bondeni demolitions) or the Public Health Ordinance whereby 
each room or family unit would be considered a dwelling. The latter method 
was obviously more cumbersome but it was not as politically sensitive as it 
was based on relatively impartial public health criteria. Using the Public 
Health Ordinance, a larger number of houses could be demolished in part, a 
group of rooms at a time. So it was decided that this increasingly sensitive 
programme of redevelopment would proceed on this latter basis. 
Given the fact that the Council had proven its willingness to 
demolish and had the appropriate legal tools to do so, opposition was focussed 
not against the demolition itself but against the redevelopment plan in an 
attempt to push it in the direction of the interest group - in this case the 
Somali householders. This debate was indeed to force the administration, albeit 
very grudgingly, to build their plans around the rehousing of the plotholders. 
In this regard the minutes of a meeting held between Somali elders, the Town 
Clerk and the District Commissioner are interesting, especially when compared 
to the meeting of 24 November 1953 outlined above. 
This meeting was between five Somali representatives on one side 
and the Town Clerk, his Deputy and the D„C, on the other. The following is 
an outline of their discussions-
32. At a joint meeting of the Finance and General Purposes and Public 
Health Committees. 
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The Somali elders stated they had requested the 
meeting to see the Municipal Council with regard 
to promises made to build houses on a hire purchase 
scheme for members of the Somali community. The 
Town Clerk stated at the outset that the Council 
had not promised to build houses but would try to 
obtain loan funds from the government. The Somalis 
reiterated their version of the story and said that 
the Somali community had agreed to the suggested monthly 
rental of 280/50, 
The Town Clerk repeated that at no time had a 
firm promise been made and further that he had no 
recollection whatsoever of the figure 280/50 per 
month. He referred to the information given the 
Somali elders by the Council's Housing and Estates 
Officer wherein It had been proved to the Somalis 
that the income from a house with nine rooms would 
be 350/- whereas the monthly outgoings would be 
354/-. and for a 12 room house the monthly income 
would be 495/- and the outgoings 516/75, In view 
of these figures, the Council were satisfied that 
the proposal to erect rental houses on a hire 
purchase system was not economically possible. 
The Somalis referred to the alternate 
accommodation available in the number 4 housing 
scheme and stated they could not afford to pay 
the monthly rent for such houses,, They stated 
they would be much happier if they could build 
their own houses in the new Somali. Location and 
would agree to pay the Council whatever the Council 
assessed as rent. 
The Town Clerk noted that there was an 
inconsistency here. The houseowners replied that if 
they were to build their own houses, they would 
endeavor to obtain any shortfall from someone else 
who might help them. In the meantime they asked 
whether it would not be possible to defer demolition 
until some decision on the application for a government 
loan could be received. This was denied. 
The Somalis stated that in these circumstances 
the Council and the government were throwing them 
out on the street as they could not afford a house 
in the new scheme. They had no money and as far as 
they were concerned it was now up to the government 
to do what they liked. 
The D,C0 responded that they were in effect asking 
to undertake a financial liability over a period of 
20 years. They would have no income whatsoever and 
only face a monthly deficit. The houseowners stated 
that they hoped to make up this deficit from somewhere 
and that this way the houses would be theirs at the 
end o'F 20 years. The government had originally 
authorized them to live in their present location 
and as the government now wanted them to move it 
should make a-.vailable funds for them to build new 
houses. The elders would like to be told how they 
should live, as they had no businesses and they 
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were living on the income from rents. 
The D.C„ rejected this statement as a complete 
self-contradiction. The elders responded, that they 
would just lie in the streets and die „„„„ 
The D.C., noting the fact that the Somali community 
had received not less than five years warning of the 
forthcoming demolition said that they as leaders of 
the Somali community should have made plans to meet 
the situation when it arrived. His best advice for 
them was to build small houses on the plots available 
and as and when they acquired additional funds they 
might consider extending them. 
This meeting and other similar ones which took place afterwards 
were thoroughly unsatisfactory as far as the Somalia were concerned. Aside 
from being characterised by a high level of sophistry on all sides, it was 
the unstated propositions that made true dialogue impossible. With careful 
ingenuousness the administration argued that the householders could no 
longer afford to own rental houses. The Somalis could only fall back on 
33 
restatements of their special relationship to the government. There was 
no way of explicitly stating in this atmosphere of piously assumed legality, 
that rent controls or no, the Somalis knew they could derive income from large 
rental, houses. That the administration knew this too was obvious as was 
their desire to limit the possibilities for Somalis to become large-scale renters 
again, given the many administrative headaches caused by many charges of 
rent abuse levelled against the landlords by their tenants and the counter-
charges of rent evasion they brought against their tenants. 
Their attempts to again widen the arena of debate, as in their 
meeting with the Minister of Housing (on August 19, 1958) wherein the 
Minister gravely lectured them on the limits of his ministerial authority 
which did not extend to demolition but only to the construction of houses, 
were thus largely frustrated. Still, the effect of this extensive politicking, 
althought not all the Somalis might have hoped, was a better offer than previous 
plotholders had been given. In the compromise first worked out by the 
Provincial Commissioner, the Somalis were given double plots (many soon divided 
among an enlarged group of owners) and small three-room tenant-purchase 
houses built for them on long-term government loans, designed so as to be 
easily enlargeable for rental purposes. Businessmen applied to have business 
premises built into their dwellings, and (at a fee) this was done. Their 
success in getting concessions from the administration should be measured 
not only against that which came before but against the weak legal position 
from which they were forced to argue. Two of the recalcitrant houseowners 
33. For illustrations of this see Appendix 1 of Wachtel, 24. 
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(both non-resident in the buildings) were taken to court to try to bring 
the rest of the community in line, and while the senior resident magistrate's 
34 
judgement, "a tongue-lashing of considerable severity which undercut all their 
arguments, might have inclined the community to accept a compromise, it is 
interesting that this did not do more to push the Council back to a central 
focus on the tenants. 
The official opening of the New Somali Location took place on 
30 May 1959 with considerable fanfare. Invited guests included the Ministers 
of Local Government and of Housing, the Commissioner of Lands, the Director 
of Surveys and the Town Planning Advisor, an impressive list from the national 
administration, reflecting the scale of the political battle which was ending. 
The last phase of demolition in the Old Bondeni redevelopment scheme 
thus far took place during and after the Somali location programme and was much 
affected by it. The same legal approach was taken by the Council, using the 
Public Health Ordinance provisions. The tenants could go into the fifth 
Municipal Housing Scheme then under construction (Kaloleni Estate), and a 
tenant-purchase scheme was developed for the plotholders (plot 73-77). 
Businessmen who wanted to relocate within the residential area (as was 
allowed to a certain extent in the New Somali Location), did not get that 
concession in this case as the Council was busy filling a commercial centre 
to serve the surrounding municipal housing estates as a group. This 
arrangement seemed to be about the best that the plotholders could expect, 
and everyone seemed willing to work through this phase of Bondeni redevelopment 
35 
without going to court. Such an agreement was in fact reached in the special 
subcommittee meeting of the General Ward Council held on 3 June 1959. 
There were delays though. Landlords argued special problems in 
finding alternative housing for all their dependents, new tenants popped 
up as soon as old ones were rehoused and claimed to have been there all the 
time (some of these were destitutes and represented a special problem in 
rehousing), and the business establishments in two of the houses remained 
long after the rest had been demolished as the business owners dickered for 
more time to wind up their affairs ^(one diehard vacated his business premises 
34. The judgement is exerpted in Appendix 3, Wachtelj 24. 
35. Letter from the Town Clerk to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry 
of Local Government, Nairobi, 31 July 1959. 
36„ Report on the progress of the demolition submitted by the Town Clerk, 
18 July 1960, and letter on remaining demolition from Housing and Estates 
Officer to Town Clerk, 22 September 1960. 
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37 
in February 1961 but continued to live in the back). Worse than delays, 
other sorts of problems came up. Two of the six plotholders, owners of 
plots 76 and 77, did not join in the agreement with thei CcbdinciT. Perhaps 
initially this was because they were absentee landlords living in other towns 
and the Council's contact with them through their caretakers was poor. In 
any case it was necessary to take all heads of households in these two houses 
to court and secure eviction notices, (Criminal cases, MCN us. occupiers of 
plots 76 and 77, Bondeni, 9 November 1959) But a more worrisome reason for 
this stubborness was that the tenants of these houses now had cause to join 
with the plotholders in refusing to budge. Because of their policy of keeping 
rents "economic" in the municipal housing estates, the Council found itself 
forced to raise rents in the new housing in which these tenants were to be 
relocated. The tenants, angered by what they regarded as an underhanded move, 
and backed by the Nakuru African District Congress, refused to cooperate further 
38 
and the Council was forced to sort the matter out through the courts, Thus 
even in this latest phase of demolition, despite all that had gone before 
that should have led to a regularisation and routinisation of the development 
process, issues continued to arise which obstructed swift and orderly develop-
ment. 
Because of these various problems and delays, the decade during 
which the housing policies outlined above were in force saw only limited 
demolition and little redevelopment of the Old Bondeni area. The Somali 
location was virtually all destroyed and rebuilt elsewhere, but Old Bondeni 
itself was mostly harassed. Demolition took place along the southern and 
eastern edges, leaving the bulk (and in fact the oldest and probably the most 
objectionable part from a public health point of view) untouched, 
INDEPENDENCE AND A NEW MUNICIPAL DECISION-MAKING OUANDRY 
Independence was the symbol of the rise of a new order. It 
represented the rejection of the junior-partner multi-racialism and reesta-
blished the African community as having the preeminent interest in the nation's 
development. That had certain, again somewhat symbolic, implications for 
housing policy. The concepts of "African housing5 and "African locations' 
37, Letter regarding the tearoom on plot 73 from the Town Clerk to the 
Municipal Medical Officer of Health, 22 February 1961. 
38, Letter from Town Clerk to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local 
Government, Health and Town Planning, 4 Nol/ember 1959. 
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were unacceptable, and so housing policy became more unified under a socio-
economic model,, Low-cost housing remained the problem mainly of the Council. 
"Bedspace" was to be deleted from the planning vocabulary, and building single 
39 room units became not merely undesirable but suspect. 
NaKuru's economic role in relation to its hinterland did not 
change fundamentally in this period (nor indeed did the country's general 
economic posture). So in the sense that the new order had to deal with essen-
tially the same economic structure, there was a continuity in problems and 
to some extent in the policies and planned solutions.^ To return to our case 
study, Old Bondeni was found undesirable by the new Authority for most of the 
same reasons given by the old Council, and its demolition and redevelopment 
represented much the same kind of problem for the local authorities, only, 
as is argued below, the problem became nearly insurmountable. 
Independence brought a change in the position of local authorities 
in Kenya, even long-standing ones such as the Nakuru Municipal Council. One 
aspect of this was that while in the preceding period and especially during 
the Emergency there had been a sort of mutually protective compact among the 
municipal authority, district and central elements of the administration and 
the legislators, which had worked to keep Old Bondeni redevelopment a local 
issue under local control, that compact no longer existed. Instead initiatives 
and intervention in municipal housing plans and even in problems such as the 
Old Bondeni redevelopment began to come from outside the local authority and 
the possibilities for turning redevelopment into a political issue at several 
levels increased. 
A related aspect was the fiscal position of the town. Towns took 
on new responsibilities, the most onerous of which was primary education. 
39. Municipal authorities in the 1950s planned to provide adequate 
family accommodation for the stabilised work force and sought to abandon the 
bedspace concept. However, housing shortages and economic considerations made 
it expedient to build mostly single-room units. At Independence, municipal 
housing consisted of 3,676 one-room, 288 two-room (some of these tenant-
purchase units) and 16 three-room dwellings (some tenant purchase). Early 
post-independence housing proposals differed from these late colonial ones 
not so much in substance as in tone. See, for example, the very interesting 
Annual Report of the Social Services and Housing Department, City Council 
of Nairobi, 1964. 
40. See Annual Report of the Social Services and Housing Department, 
City Council of Nairobi, 1967, which readss-
It must be remembered that good housing conditions not only 
promote health of the mind. They promote health, happiness 
and contentment thereby helping to preserve an orderly and 
peaceful community. As His Worship the Mayor „.„ said to our 
President last year ..„ "The effects of bad housing are vastly 
expensive to the community in terms of human suffering, impaired 
efficiency, sickness and death and as such are a handicap to our 
economic growth." 
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Their revenues, through rates, licenses, lettings and a share of the recently 
repealed graduated personal tax (in effect a tax which penalised smaller 
centres in favour of headquarter towns), were not adequate (see 17) and their 
credit-worthiness poor. Worse still, central authorities had little faith in 
the administrative capabilities of local governments or the intentions of 
local politicians.^ Proposals and programmes coming from the local authorities 
were carefully vetted and in this sense too the central administration assumed 
a more interventionist approach. The open lack of confidence in local 
authorities did nothing to improve the situation. Even relatively well-organised 
authorities such as the Nakuru Council suffered from this distance that 
had grown between the levels of government. 
Many local authorities have indeed beggared themselves and although 
Nakuru's affairs are not in this state, even the largest towns have difficulty 
nowadays securing the money to maintain an adequate housing programme. 
But adequate housing is one of the most visible "fruits of Uhuru® and therefore 
a political essential. Caught in this bind, it is little wonder that programmes 
are always under review, all solutions are reevaluated and, while problems 
and goals may still seem clear, housing policy itself is fluid. 
After Demolition,,What? 
The immediate pre-independence years were ones of uncertainty marked 
by a significant contraction of the economy. This and the short life of 
new policies meant that in the main the old policy directions were maintained 
and new programmes were launched not so much to initiate development, but in 
reaction to pressing problems. 
In Nakuru pressing problems arose quickly when controls on movement 
and access were lifted as the Emergency period came to a close. The town 
received a large inflow of former squatters, detainees and repatriated persons, 
people who had been bottled up during the Emergency. (M.C.N. Social Service 
Department, monthly reports, 1960-1962,) This influx coincided with a period 
of serious business contraction, thus requiring a smaller work force in ab-
solute terms, and represented in relative terms a dramatic problem of unemploy-
ment and destitution. 
The implications of this situation in terms of housing were that 
the Council for a time was confronted with increased overcrowding in their 
own low-cost estates and in low-cost 'problem areas' such as Old Bondeni. 
41. See H. Colebatch, 1, for a review of the crisis-oriented approach 
of local authorities and the effects of interventionist policies on the part 
of central agencies in weakening local effectiveness still further. 
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At the same time, the Council could not easily fill its medium- and 
higher-rent estates, and thus faced a revenue shortfall complicated by 
42 
increased demands on services. The last major housing project of the 
colonial era, Flamingo Estate (opened in 1962), went some way toward easing 
this situation, adding over 1,000 units of low-rent, single-room accommodation. 
But because of the increased low-income population, even this large project 
did not allow much scope for rehousing Old Bondeni residents to pave the way 
for a further phase of demolition. 
The new Council did not find its economic position much improved. 
Uncertainty persisted for a number of years in this transitional period. 
It took some time too for the new rural landowner group (small-holders being 
introduced to cash crops and new large-scale ventures) in Nakuru's hinterland 
to take up the slack and establish a production pattern that would allow 
for further growth. (see 2, for example) It was not until the late 1960s 
that Nakuru®s economy was on the upswing and not until the 1970s that large-
43 scale investment and expansion started taking place. 
But while the economy may have been at a low, expectations were 
increasing, and the new Council was given further responsibilities. The 
political pressures were great. Again this made it impossible on one hand 
to ignore the question of Old Bondeni's redevelopment and on the other very 
difficult and politically uncomfortable to deal with it. 
At first glance it would seem that the Council did ignore it. If 
we look at municipal estates built since 1963 we see a very different pattern 
from the pre-independence years. If we include tenant-purchase and mortgage 
schemes in the list, there were 456 one-room, 602 two-room, 199 three-room 
and 20 five-room dwellings built. Moreover the single-room accommodation 
(Dedan Kimathi Estate) was completed In the first years of Independence and 
was a sort of continuation of the Flamingo Estate,^ This is manifestly not 
a low-income housing policy. But this does an injustice to the Council because 
it was trying to work out policies explicitly aimed at redeveloping Old 
Bondeni during this period. It is to these attempts that we now turn. 
42. See, for example, Housing and Estates Committee meeting of 10 December 
1962 and Nakuru District Annual Reports, 1961 and 1963. 
43. This trend can be traced in governmental statistical reports, e.g., 
Employment and Earnings in the Modern Sector, 1963-67 and 1968-70. In Nakuru, 
recent development has included a battery factory, a rubber products plant and 
expansion in the agro-industrial sector in pyrethrum processing, grain handling 
and storage, and edible oil milling, 
44. M„C0N. Housing and Estates Department, memorandum on housing estates, 
1974. 
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During the course of the three phases of Old Bondeni demolition, 
the householders had again and again put forth their claims to special 
consideration and, though rebuffed by the courts, they did establish them-
selves as an interest group the Council had to take into account. That is, 
Bondeni redevelopment involved two problems; how to rehouse the tenants and 
how to deal with the householders. The solution most palatable to the house-
holder group was to recombine the two problems and find a solution that would 
as far as possible .preserve the householder's position, i.e., give him a 
potential rental income. The advantage that this approach had for the Council 
was that the rental potential could be applied to loan repayments. In 1964 
the Municipal Council opted for this solution and inquired about the possi-
bilities of a £500,000 loan from the Central Housing Board to enable private 
45 
plotholders to redevelop their plots. This was refused with the explanation 
that no funds for such a project were then available.^ 
The Commissioner of Lands, impatient at the lack of progress in 
redevelopment, asked the Council in late '1965 to surrender title of the land 
so it would be granted to individuals, since it did not seem to be in a posi-
47 
tion to rebuild Bondeni on its own as a rental scheme. The Council tried to 
48 
make its position clear. It was willing to see the site redeveloped by 
the householders and other individuals, but under long leases so it could 
better monitor the redevelopment process. 
The Council cast about for other possible solutions. The 
Commissioner of Lands was informed a few months later that no policy would 
be set out For Old Bondeni redevelopment "until the position regarding the 
49 
proposed site-and-service scheme has been finalised". Now seemed to be the 
time for site-and-service. 
Site-and-service was a planners' not a politicians' solution. Its 
main attractiveness lay in its low cost, i.e., its practicality or rather 
the way in which it could potentially mobilise the resources of even low-
income groups so that they shared the housing costs directly. The drawback from a 
45. M.C.N. archives, file A/5, letter from Town Clerk to Chief Executive 
Officer, Central Housing Board, 29 February 1964. 
46. M.C.N, archives, file A/5, reply of Chief Executive Officer, Central 
Housing Board, to Town Clerk, 2 July 1965. 
47. M.C.N, archives, file A/5, letter from Commissioner of Lands to 
Town Clerk, 23 December 1965. 
48. M.C.N. archives, file A/5, report from Town Clerk to Commissioner 
of Lands, 13 January 1966. 
49. M.C.N, archives, file A/5, letter from Town Clerk to Town Planning 
Advisor, 30 July 1966. 
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strictly political point of view was that it was not as impressive as housing 
and it was difficult to control. There were other pros and cons, but really 
there was no debate, Site-and-service was being touted nationally (inter-
nationally in fact)„ Nairobi, for one, had embarked on a pilot scheme at 
50 
Kariobangi and was putting the best possible complexion on the results. 
Moreover there was money for it. Nonetheless it was not to be a solution 
to the Old Bondeni problem. The location of the scheme did not appeal to 
much of the householder group because it was far from the mosque and other 
centres of community life. Then too, the Council did not wish to give up too 
much control and intended to enforce high building standards (which for many 
meant prohibitive costs). The house designs the Council strongly suggested 
did not give much scope for rental accommodation. And of course rents large 
enough to give a decent return on investment precluded the housing of Old 
Bondeni tenants in such a scheme. A site-and-service scheme (Langa Langa 
I and II) was put into effect, a substantial amount of fairly good housing 
was added to the town's stock, but none of this touched on the Old Bondeni 
problem. 
That being the case, the solution which commended itself to the 
51 
Council was a tenant-purchase scheme. It was being applied at Nairobi in 
the Pumwani Redevelopment Scheme : i.e., in an almost exactly comparable 
situation (as to both housing and community features) to Old Bondeni. In 
1968, the Council was working on this plan, intending to give Bondeni house-
owners priority in the scheme. A sub-committee was sent to tour Pumwani and 
50. The Annual Report of the Social Services and Housing Department, 
City Council of Nairobi, 1965, statedi— 
]_ the_7 Kariobangi site and service scheme „, „ J_ was_7 
providing much needed cheap accommodation to the low income 
groups employed by commercial firms and the government .... 
Thirteen and a half per cent of the total number originally 
given plots in the scheme actually lived on site; 35g°/o lived 
in the city but outside the scheme; 79B/o of those who lived 
away from the site constructed and completed houses in the 
scheme from which they collected monthly rents at an average 
of shillings 45/=. 
This is a nice way of gliding over the fact that site-and-service schemes 
seemed to represent a temporary windfall for poor allottees, and a long-term 
investment return for people who could actually afford to build, who in many 
cases continued to live in other accommodation, often Municipal estates. 
51. M 0C 0N. archives, file A/5, letter from Town Clerk to Town Planning 
Advisor, 30 June 1966, 
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52 
report on its possible application. They returned impressed but discouraged. 
The multi-storied blocks of flats in New Pumwani seemed altogether too 
grandiose, too expensive for the Bondeni householders (and of course no help 
in rehousing the tenant population]. They had envisioned a more modest scheme 
for Old Bondeni with householders getting houses with two additional rooms, 
the rent from which would be collected by the Council in repayment of loans. 
Aside from the authorities in Nairobi who vetted their plans, the 
Council's work was being watched by several groups who had an interest in the 
scheme. The houseowner group which had been brought together by redevelopment 
at various points in its history finally organised itself formally in 1969. 
Under the leadership of a cadre of influential community members, the house-
owners registered in March 1969 as the Bondeni Plotholders Company with 
53 
a wide-ranging constitution. One of their principal aims was to present 
an organised and united front in redevelopment discussions, to press their 
case and to keep their membership informed about the implications of plans 
54 
and decisions. They had in fact been active for some time prior to official 
registration, under various guises. Under the provisional title of Bondeni 
Building Company they held a tea for councillors and other officials on 
10 November 1968 to sound them out. (treasurer's files, 10 November 1968] 
In effect the company has been something of a mutual defense group. The 
houseowners" posture has remained a reactive one, commenting on proposals but 
feeling it not their place (nor in their interests as somewhat beleaguered 
defenders of the status quo] to initiate plans. 
Other interested parties who entered the discussion at this point 
were national level politicians. When the Minister for Housing, the Hon, 
Paul Ngei, visited Nakuru to open a municipal housing estate, the M.P« from 
the Nakuru area, Mr. Mwithaga, took the opportunity to raise the question of 
uncompleted redevelopment of Old Bondeni. This was embarrassing 'for'the 
Council because it received national press coverage which focussed on the 
fact that old, overcrowded locations such as Old Bondeni were a disappointment 
52. Report on Pumwani redevelopment scheme, M.C„N„ subcommittee, 18 
November 1968. 
53. Bondeni Plotholders Co. , files, constitution and correspondence, 
54. From interviews with members of the company's executive, Old Bondeni, 
1974, The company continued to press for large boarding-house type buildings 
for the tenant-purchase scheme, even though this was consistently rejected 
as much too costly by the municipal authorities. They complained that the 
proposed house designs were nice, but were just too small. Even aside from 
tenants, they had relatives they housed, etc. 
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after some years of independence, rather than focussing on positive municipal 
achievements, i.e., the opening of the municipal estate,, It also had a 
positive effect in Council eyes in that the Minister made general promises 
of assistance and asked for certain information, T'he municipal administration 
eventually submitted a quite detailed report based on a large-scale social 
55 survey of the area's residents,, The Municipal Council carried on with its 
56 
plans hopeful that they would be approved. 
Ministry of Housing officials intervened at several stages, rejecting 
a simple single storey design submitted in 1971 on the grounds that it 
was "unenterprising" and "monotonous" in its architectural impact. They 
sent instead a suggestion for a double storey plan which would be more 
57 
interesting and economical in terms of land use. Municipal authorities 
balked at this. They had surveys which indicated the financial capabilities 
of Old Bondeni residents and sent a delegation to the Ministry to try to 
straighten the matter out.^® 
In 1972, having considered the problems involved in phased 
redevelopment of the Old Bondeni site, they resited the scheme on the near-
by empty Old Prison's area, just to the west, and had the area surveyed, 
59 
laid out and planned. This site met with the approval of the houseowner 
group as its location was convenient and near enough to the mosque to satisfy 
the Islamic segment. Houseowners liked the designs, although as always they 
would have preferred even more rental space. Former householders who had 
never been compensated in the demolitions got their names put down in a list 
of potential claimants drawn up by the Council. 
55. Report by Housing and Estates Officer, MSC0N,, to the Minister 
for Housing, 28 September 1971. Up-to-date surveys are a necessary 
precondition for redevelopment and, because of its long 'redevelopment' 
history, many were done of Old Bondeni for various authorities. For example, 
the Health Department did a physically oriented survey in 1967 for submission 
to the town planning advisor; the housing and estates department did a social 
survey in 1968 and updated it in 1971 for preparation of the report for the 
minister; and in 1973 the architect's office of the town engineer's depart-
ment did another large social survey,, For analysis based on these survey 
data, see Wachtel, 25. 
56. Housing and Estates Committee meeting of 15 November 1971, and 
submission to Ministry of Housing,, 
57. MoCoN. archives, file A/5, letter from Ministry of Housing to 
Municipal Engineer, 23 December 1971. 
58. M.C„N. archives, file A/5, letter from Town Clerk to Ministry 
of Housing, 14 February 1972. 
59. M.C.No archives, file A/5, letter from Town Engineer to M/S 
Hime and Zimmerlin, licensed surveyors, 7 June 1972. 
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The whole plan collapsed in 1974„ The Ministry of Housing made 
it clear to the municipal authorities that it no 'longer financed tenant-
purchase schemes from governmental development funds and suggested trying to 
finance the scheme through the Housing Finance Company of Kenya or foreign 
aid schemes. Otherwise, the Ministry could only suggest a review of alter-
60 
natives, site-and-service, and so on. The Housing Finance Company was 
61 
approached and said there were no funds available for such a project. 
The problem has come full circle again. There is a proposed very 
low rent project which might potentially absorb some of Old Bondeni's residents 
(however there are numerous other target groups in unauthorised housing 
around the town and in the Council's temporary substandard estate of Pangani). 
There may be a new site-and-service scheme which might attract the partici-
pation of some houseowners. Aside from these sorts of plans which seem to 
enjoy the approval of central authorities, there is a new interest in salvage 
and rehabilitation of the existing housing or some sort of community improve-
ment scheme. As of the second half of 1974, plans were still uncertain. 
The Political Dimension 
The redevelopment of Old Bondeni has always been more a political 
problem than a technical and administrative one. That is not to say that 
the administrative problems were simple or that the technical problems have 
been solved. Rather the political elements (especially the political 
definition of the problem) have dominated. When a stabilised African urban 
work force became a recognised component of the urban development programme 
Old Bondeni seemed to jeopardise that policy symbolically by denying progress 
and modernity, socially by being unmanageable, 'disorganised', and harboring 
marginal elements, and physically by creating a public health menace. The 
added impetus of the Emergency prompted a "positive' response and actual 
demolition was undertaken. 
The administration seemed to preserve a unified front in the face 
of opposition hamstrung by Emergency measures which made political confron-
tation difficult and actually removed some local leadership.^ At the same time, 
however, the administration was circumspect and proper in its dealings, worked 
hard to keep communication channels open, and coloured its actions in the 
most apolitical light. The administration invoked the values of development, 
60. M.C.N, archives, file A/5, letter from Ministry of Housing to 
Nakuru Town Clerk, 8 March 1974. 
61. M.C.N, archives, file A/5, internal correspondence from Municipal 
Treasury to Town Clark, 6 April 1974. 
62. For example, the first African representatives on the Nakuru 
Municipal Council were detained. 
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the public interest, and warned of the dangers Old Bondeni represented to 
health, safety and community morals,, Interested parties^ householders, 
businessmen and tenants alike, could scarcely protest. All they could press 
for was equitable treatment. 
Municipal authorities generally did tie demolition to the 
availability of alternate public housing. They tried to satisfy the commercial 
group by creating shopping centres nearby and in some of the larger municipal 
housing estates. Eventually they also made concessions to the householder 
group, experimenting with a tenant purchase scheme and allowing Somali 
houseowners to reestablish themselves as lodging house proprietors. Despite 
all these ways in which the situation was carefully managed so as to minimise 
the scope for confrontation, municipal authorities failed to redevelop Old 
Bondeni in the last decade of colonial administration and in the process 
unwittingly provided an impetus for interest groups to coalesce around issues 
and develop channels of protest. 
After Independence, municipal politicians were anxious not even 
to suggest an adversary relationship to the Old Bondeni population. Consul-
tation in planning and consensus on redevelopment, however desirable, did 
make procedures cumbersome. But the Municipality has been constrained most 
by its dependence upon and accountability to central authorities and planners. 
The process of reconciling the requirements, demands and desires of the 
various interest groups within Nakuru with those arising at higher levels 
of government has been tortuous. The Municipality finds itself always in a 
reactive position, even as it is formulating plans, and it has not been able 
to react fast enough to secure acceptance of any "solution" to Bondeni re-
development. As of 1974, twenty years after the area was scheduled to be 
razed, it seemed that Bondeni would continue to linger in this strange state 
of limbo unless the initiative could be returned to the local level. 
In some respects, the incentives to redevelop Old Bondeni are not 
as strong now as formerly. The problems claimed for the area down through 
the years persist, but Bondeni is no longer unique. There are other areas 
63 
of uncontrolled and substandard housing in Nakuru. The municipal housing 
programme faces as great a demand backlog as ever.^ Old Bondeni residents, 
houseowners and tenants alike, resist removal to more expensive accommodation. 
In the face of all this, there seems to be no specially compelling reason 
63. For a discussion of one of these, see E„N„D, Ndegwa, 14. 
64. For example, the 1972 Annual Report showed an increase in the number 
of applicants for municipal housing of 27, EP/o between 1970 and 1971, and 
22„8% in 1972 (to a total of 5,477 applicants). 
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to commit resources for redevelopment. 
Just as municipal authorities reluctantly have learned to live 
with Bondeni as a chronic but seldom acute problem, Bondeni residents live 
relatively placidly under the threat of removal. The difference is that, 
however uncomfortable the problem has been for urban authorities (and how-
ever symptomatic of the difficult position in which the municipalities find 
themselves), it is Old Bondeni that has borne the real costs of arrested 
development. 
It is well known that one of the best ways of systematically 
degrading a neighbourhood is to schedule it for demolition and redevelop-
65 
ment. By doing so you eliminate the incentive to maintain or upgrade the 
properties, to preserve or initiate social or commercial ventures; often 
you actually disallow initiative by withholding permits, etc. Legal 
sanctions designed to enforce minimal compliance with standards and regu-r-
lations also tend to become unenforceable, 
When redevelopment is indefinitely postponed, the area is likely 
to decline to a level that makes any reconsideration of the decision to 
demolish unlikely as, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, the area becomes unsal-
vageable. The impression gained in Old Bondeni is that there were enough 
positive factors at work to partially arrest that decline and stabilise the 
66 
area. But it has lost a great deal of generative potential and the popu-
lation has become gradually more marginal. 
The remaining advantages of Old Bondeni centre on the combination 
of a good central location and low absolute rents. The area is in some senses 
well-serviced; nearby are schools, masques and churches, the social services 
complex, a small market, the fire station, etc. It is also an easy walk 
from the town centre. All this is obviously attractive to several groupings 
(see 25), among them a core of both old and young female-headed house-
holders, who can translate those locational advantages into opportunities 
for service employment in the informal sector. Some of these activities, 
illegal beer selling being one example, are ambiguously affected by other 
65. This proposition is explored in a number of landmark monographs, 
peripherally in Gans, 4, and systematically in Marris, 13. 
66. One of the factors which helped was that demolition took place 
largely at the margins of the neighbourhood, rather than opening up major 
gaps. A second factor is that majengo housing with its mud and wattle walls 
plastered over is not difficult to maintain at some minimal level. This 
is not to argue that the area has been kept up, but the fact that many of the 
houses are owner-occupied or supervised by relatives combined with the 
modest outlays required for ordinary maintenance meant that housing remained 
at some limited standard. 
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nearby services - the Bondeni police station and the Municipal brewery and 
canteen. Except for the scarcity of garden plots nearby, a point which 
favours some of the peripheral unauthorised housing, and the lack of 
supervision in the outskirts that facilitate; brewing and other illegal 
activities, Bondeni is 'ideal8. That is, no other area in town offers the 
urban poor as good a mix of advantages. 
The lowest cost municipal housing estates (with the exception 
of the substandard 'temporary' development of Pangani erected in 1948) are 
both better serviced and better maintained than Bondeni, but the greatest 
disadvantage of these areas is cost. Rents, while low, are higher absolutely 
than Old Bondeni and include charges for services. To bring rents down to 
a level comparable to those Bondeni residents are used to involves subletting. 
Subdividing single room units may make them less attractive from several 
points of view than physically inferior accommodation in Bondeni. If we 
assume further that municipal housing estates are also better controlled so 
that, for example, conviction for illegal beer selling means possible eviction 
and nonstandard use of space or facilities involves the resident in 
bureaucratic wrangling, then the municipal housing option seems even less 
attractive. 
The location of municipal housing estates in roughly the same 
area offers comparable if marginally inferior locational advantages. Distance 
from the Bondeni mosque has been a consideration for the Islamic segments 
of the community. 
While everyone agrees that Old Bondeni does not provide the most 
desirable environment, resistance to being displaced arises from more than 
inertia alone. The houseowners, designated caretakers and other dependents, 
and many tenants would suffer real drains on their income under any of the 
proposed redevelopment schemes. More difficult to measure, there are certain 
costs to be borne arising out of community break-up and social disruption. 
The issue made of needing to be close to the mosque may in part be an expression 
of that feeling among the long-established Islamic element. 
That is still phrasing the argument too negatively. It is easy 
to show that people are "trapped " in a slum because they have no alternatives. 
In this case however, Old Bondeni is not so much a choice of last resort as 
an area with a number of real advantages for poor residents. Without mini-
mising the physical and environmental problems or unduly romanticising 
elements of community solidarity and continuity, Old Bondeni has a certain 
character and a positive aspect that deserves to be recognised in any re-
development plan. 
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CONCLUSION I! SLUM REHABILITATION 
A number of fairly simple notions have slowly and painfully gained 
acceptance within academic urban studies and have been taken up for appli-
cation to programmes of action,, Among these was the recognition that not 
all areas of deteriorated or substandard housing could be classed indiscri-
67 68 
minately as slums,, There were many different types of "slums' and 
the differences were fundamental not incidental,, An understanding of the 
„69 
potential of "slums of hope" presented planners with new alternatives 
which were particularly attractive. The poor would willingly incur major 
costs of development if benefits were apparent, Moreover, the development, 
while often nonstandard, might result in relatively controlled areas of 
reasonably good quality housing. 
The widespread acceptance by planners and governments of site-and-
service approaches represented one major attempt to formalise and integrate 
70 
this potential for action within wider developmental planning. What are 
essentially parallel considerations lie behind the dissemination of the idea 
of neighbourhood rehabilitation, (For an East African example, see 6,) 
Finally, there is now a clearer understanding of the social implications 
of certain types of physical or technical redevelopment variables, (house 71 form, estate configuration, building height, access to roads, etc.). 
Plans for Old Bondeni redevelopment have taken into account each 
of these important notions as they apply in the Kenyan context. They have 
come up with little that is encouraging. Old Bondeni housing is not 
rehabilitable in any usual sense. It is of semi-permanent or temporary 
construction of little inherent value, often poorly constructed and more 
often still poorly maintained. While there are stand pipes and minimal 
electrification, it would be extremely costly to extend the water borne 
67, For example, through the work of W„ Mangin and his associates 
in Lima, Peru, See the references in 12, 
68, In this regard, the work of G.D, Suttles has fleshed out the pic-
ture of the normative/integrative aspect of certain kinds of slum communities 
defined along the dimensions (ethnicity, family type, socio-economic status/ 
class, homogeneity) that have been put forward by social area analysis. 
See 21, for an influential American example. 
69, A distinction popularised by Stokes, but implicit in many other 
studies. See 18, 
70, 'I he best overview of how site-and-service was initially translated 
in the Kenyan context is found in Hou'lberg, 8, For a serious evaluation 
and critique which fits this particular case, see Harris, 7. 
71, In the U„So context, the work with the greatest impact in terms of 
planning procedure has been Oscar Newman's. See 15. This work evaluates low-
cost public housing schemes arid sets out a number of guidelines to maximise 
neighbourhood security, stability and use of facilities. 
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sewerage grid. The area is certainly unsavoury with generally inadequate 
pit latrines (bucket latrines and the system of night soil collection were 
largely unlamented casualties of the modernisation drives). The cost of 
improving the area using variants of the site-and-service approach also 
seemed prohibitive. 
72 
Municipal surveys of houseowners showed that a large proportion 
claimed that their resources - income from rents, from employment or what-
ever - were insufficient to pay the costs the municipality projected for site 
improvement and even of staged construction of housing built to municipal 
standards. Many tenants claimed they were unable or unwilling to pay more 
than their current rents for improved accommodation. While some residents 
reported skills useful in construction, only a small number expressed a 
willingness to commit time for a possible self-help housing scheme. There 
was no significant sign of harambee efforts directed at community improvement 
or maintenance; whitewashing and superficial clean-ups were organised by the 
city. 
It seems to me, however, that these negative conclusions reflect 
a frame of inquiry which has been too narrow. Municipal authorities have 
gone from one plan of redevelopment to the next examining each idea for its 
applicability, but never fundamentally abandoning their original assumptions. 
These ares that Old Bondeni is a multi-problem area physically and socially, 
that it has decayed beyond any hope of simple salvage or rehabilitation, 
and that the major work that would be needed to rebuild it is beyond the 
means of the population. The logic of all the plans depends on these assump-
tions. But these are the original assumptions which express (and are limited 
by) the understandings of their day. They have locked municipal authorities 
and perforce Bondeni residents into a pattern of lost initiatives. 
The core problem of Old Bondeni is poverty, poverty grounded in 
marglnality and limited opportunity. While no attempt to deal with Old 
Bondeni can attack these fundamental problems successfully, any attempted 
solution which ignores them entirely (and confines itself to purely physical 
conditions, for example) is likely to misfire. For twenty years whatever 
generative force existed in Old Bondeni has been thwarted or diverted into 
unproductive channels. The informal sector (upon which the I.L.O. puts so 
much store) may indeed be dependent on the formal sector, but its virtual 
suppression In Old Bondeni, an area where it might logically have been expected 
72. Some material from these surveys, and specifically the unpublished 
1974 survey conducted by M.L. Arscott, Architect's Office, Town Engineer's 
Department, Municipal Council of Nakuru, is reported in Wachtel, 25= 
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to flourish, has further limited local development. Commercial establishments 
such as eating houses were forced out of the area for health reasons, and 
discrepant users were also removed (e.g. posha grinders). These measures 
made only limited sense since no real attempt was being made otherwise to 
maintain and improve environmental conditions. Keeping Old Bondeni in the 
limbo of arrested development - not granting houseowners security of tenure 
73 
(for whatever reason), not allowing construction in permanent materials, 
abandoning even nominal positive incentives for maintaining building exteriors 
and grounds - has condemned the residents to inadequate conditions. 
My point is simply that the area was built up originally by local 
initiative, Had there been a twenty-year programme of support and guidance 
for property improvement and community action, rather than the two decades 
of uncertainty, there might be something worth salvaging and upgrading now. 
Change the working assumptions, encourage the population to express its stake 
in the community through individual and collective action monitored by 
municipal authorities, and then you can validly assess the redevelopment 
problems and prospects. In short, it is my feeling that Old Bondeni has been 
too much planned for and too little assisted. It has basked uncomfortably 
in the heat of official attention because of its visibility within a major 
urban centre. In retrospect, it might have been preferable had it not been 
so 'favoured'. In that event, the Old Bondeni community itself might have 
been left to show initiative and harambee spirit in order to try to win the 
support of government for improvements. 
73. While this has been argued in terms of trying to discourage land-
lordism and thus represents a tip of the hat to ideals of equity, the nature 
of many of the redevelopment plans and the general tenor of Kenyan urban 
development undermine that rationale. Certainly the colonial authorities' 
condemnation of Bondeni houseowners as exploiters must be seen as an 
interesting example of an astigmatic moral viewpoint. 
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